Job Today

The vivid blue sky was a stark contrast to the columns of black smoke billowing up from the New York City skyline. September 11, 2001 was a day that America awoke to shock, destruction, and dismay not unlike that day of infamy over sixty years ago when the Empire of Japan attacked Pearl Harbor by surprise. Suddenly, the armor of invincibility that the United States had been wearing for such a long time had a chink in it. The clash between the progressive nature of westernized governments and the reaction it incited within Islam had seemed so amorphous and distant. Yet on the morning of September 11 th , that conflict was now being played out in downtown New York , Washington D.C., and rural Pennsylvania . Words like the Taliban, Bin Laden, jihad and al-Qaeda were rapidly becoming part of the everyday American vocabulary. Though known throughout governmental and academic circles, these terms lay dormant to the greater U.S. population until that clear, crisp, day in the late fall when America changed. Again.

A constituent of United States Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist remarked on a tour of the Capitol building that religion had driven the planes into the World Trade Center towers in New York . Indeed, this was one of the most popular sentiments to arise out of the media coverage of September 11. This observation is correct, but needs to be refined. It was not so much that the religion of Islam was the theological motivation for the attacks, but rather an interpretation of Islam. The politicizing of Islam is often referred to as Islamism, or the Islamist movement. And that is what needs to be examined here. Though traces of Islamism can be seen as far back as the seventh century A.D., the more modern basis for the movement arose out of the 1940's and 1950's, then grew during the volatile times of the 1960's and 1970's. A Pakistani called Mawdudi and an Egyptian named Qutb were two Muslims who figure prominently in the religious ideology of the Islamist movement of the last two decades of the twentieth century. What in Mawdudi and Qutb's interpretations of the Quran and Islam was radical? What in their interpretations was appealing to other radicals who used them as the basis for their own radical interpretation? Why is there an Islamist Islam? The Islamist movement within Islam is a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon. These questions are not easily answered, but bear importance in putting together an understanding of a modern dilemma, and opening a fruitful dialogue between leaders of the West and of Muslim nations and movements.

Before venturing into the issue of Islamism, it is necessary to make several things clear. One must understand that there are many elements involved in the Islamist movement in general. The movement acquires unique characteristics depending upon the location of the country where Islamist thought has taken root. Different figures, different histories, different theologies, and different ideologies assimilate themselves into the base of Islamism in these countries, and therefore influence the Islamist movement in these countries. The purpose of this research is to lay a general groundwork and establish a background for the Islamist movement, then to identify and examine the base religious ideology behind the Islamism of the late twentieth century, not specific to any one country. Finally this research will attempt to show how Islamist religious ideology has influenced some of the Islamist groups of today.

The other aspect of not only the Islamist movement within Islam, but also of any other movement that uses religion as an ideological basis for change, whether it is political, military, etc., is that religious ideology is in fact one of the most difficult types of ideologies to change. Why is this? The answer is in large part because religious ideology is centered almost entirely on faith. In other words, it relies on faith, and faith relies on the unproven. Faith is, by its nature, distinct and separate from reason. A unique feature of faith is that it can be at once both intensely private and also greatly public. As such, it is virtually impossible to prove something from a religious standpoint that is based upon a believer's faith. One can see how difficult it would be to initiate a change in religious ideology, particularly when religion is the basis for political or militaristic action. Religious ideology, then, “exceeds all other human limits,” but “must always be mediated in human discourse and through social institutions. In its most intellectual form it becomes theology, in its most pervasive expression popular religion, and in still another form ideology.”1 By comparison, something like political ideology can be proven to work or not through the use of example, with relatively visible, and tangible results. The point here is that religious ideology seems to transcend other types of ideology. It is extremely difficult to discount someone's faith, especially when he/she believes that it is a solution to the discord and disharmony of society, and should be implemented in a political context. This must be kept in mind when attempting to understand the Islamist movement.

What is the Islamist movement? In John L. Esposito's The Oxford Dictionary of Islam , Islamist is defined as the “term used to describe an Islamic political or social activist…Islamists are committed to implementation of their ideological vision of Islam in the state and/or society. Their position is often seen as a critique of the establishment and status quo. Most belong to Islamic organizations or social movements.”2 Hence, the politicizing of Islam, or political Islam, is essentially what is generally referred to as the Islamist movement.

The oldest roots of Islamism and what would eventually become the modern Islamist movement can be generally traced back to the seventh century A.D. However, a late thirteenth and early fourteenth century Syrian thinker, Ibn Taymiyyah, is often regarded as displaying some of the earliest Islamist convictions. Considered to have fundamental tendencies during his own time, Ibn Taymiyyah believed the Quran to be the supreme authority of Islam and Muslims. He particularly advocated a literal interpretation of the Quran, and commanded all Muslims to show great piety in this regard. An aspect of great importance in Muslim life to Ibn Taymiyyah, and something which Mawdudi and Qutb would later pick up on, was the emphasis on the individual Muslim. The re-orientation of Muslims to the correct interpretation of Islam had to begin with each individual Muslim. Ijtihad , or independent reasoning, was extremely important for Ibn Taymiyyah. In his view of Islam, politics was intimately connected to literal Quranic exegesis, and by putting the shariah constructively into use in society, he wished to therefore differentiate between Islamic and jahiliyyah.3 Ibn Taymiyyah's thinking would later influence figures such as ‘Abd al-Wahhab, Mawdudi, Qutb, and some may argue, bin Laden. But it would not be correct to call Ibn Taymiyyah an Islamist per se, and it is highly likely that he would disapprove of the ways in which groups like al-Qaeda, and perhaps figures such as Mawdudi and Qutb, have interpreted his thoughts, simply because they would have deviated from the extent to which he thought Quranic exegesis should be assimilated into society. What is clear, though, is that the seeds of Islamism had been planted.

The modern Islamist movement of the latter part of the twentieth century dates from roughly 1940.4 Though the movement has encountered schisms and morphed into different groups, there are several attributes that all of the Islamist groups have in common: the belief that the current social, political, and religious institutions had failed; distrust of the West; the core of support in the educated youth; the idea that strict interpretation, and implementation into governmental structures, of the Quran could solve the corruption in the world.5 Islamism tends to be associated with young intellectuals educated through modern university systems, where they came into contact with various revolutionary political ideologies.6

Ideology appears to be a key term for Islamists, as they “consider Islam to be as much a religion as an ideology.”7 The encounter with revolutionary ideals in the university setting, such as Marxism, combined with Quranic exegesis made for a new way of thinking; “taking control of the state will allow for the spread of Islam in a society corrupted by Western values and for a simultaneous appropriation of science and technology.”8 This reveals two things: firstly, that there was already some underlying notion of dislike or suspicion of the West, especially the U.S. and Great Britain , and the cultural values they appeared to espouse, and secondly that those who would become Islamists were not averse to modernization. As a modern, it meant that ones language, ideas, education, etc. was modern as well, and not rooted in the tradition of the past.9 As Olivier Roy states, “they live in a world of movie theatres, cafes, jeans, video, and sports.”10 Roy uses the word ‘consumerism' in its most correct sense here; hence implying that Islamists do not follow the traditional forms and values of Islam. According to Roy , these values were left in their homes when they migrated to an urban setting. As non-traditionalists, “they do not advocate a return to what existed before, as do fundamentalists in the strict sense of the word, but a re-appropriation of society and technology based on politics.”11 In a peculiarly apparent contradiction, however, John L. Esposito notes that for traditionalists, the so-called Westernization of Muslim societies under the Islamists would lead to a loss of Muslim identity. But ironically, it was the Islamists who saw the potential loss of Muslim identity in the continuum of the status quo under presumably the traditionalists.12

Even though there is a distinct separation from traditional Islam, Islamists do rely upon a ‘fundamentalist' approach to the sharia , though it can be argued that Islamism is not a fundamentalist movement per se. This approach to the ideal Islamic law is “a tendency that is forever setting the reformer, the censor and the tribunal against the corruption of the times and of sovereigns, against foreign influence, political opportunism, moral laxity, and the forgetting of the sacred texts.”13 All of these ills mentioned by Roy seem to be portrayed by the West, the U.S. in particular. It may be a generalization, but for all intents and purposes, it is the image that America has projected of itself to the world.

Another commonality among Islamist groups is their affinity towards anti-colonialism. And perhaps here is where we encounter the heart of the Islamist movement. Spawned from anti-colonial sentiments of the mid-twentieth century, or as Roy implicates anti-Western sentiments during that time, were thinkers who dared to challenge and re-interpret Islam in a radical way. For these thinkers, colonialism and therefore nationalism, were seen as Godless ideologies that challenged Islam.14 Chief among these figures who had the most impact upon what would become the Islamist movement were Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb. Both came from different backgrounds and times, but were equally influential upon future Islamists, particularly with regard to religious ideology.

Before entering a discussion of Mawdudi and Qutb, it is important to keep in mind something about the nature of Islam with respect to Islamism. Deeply imbedded within, Islam has imparted a language of morality that many Muslims hold in high regard. Many have used this moral language to create an impassioned plea during their criticism of Islamic and non-Islamic governments.15 Authorities within these governments are held accountable by many Muslims for not upholding a moral code of conduct. By not partaking in the realm of morality, the doors are open for the unjust treatment of fellow Muslims. To do so not only abuses the rights of man, but more importantly, angers God. As history has shown, many Muslims have felt that it is incumbent upon themselves to correct various governmental situations. Violence and revolution are not uncommon methods of doing so. Noah Feldman notes in his work, After Jihad , that many believing Muslims are inclined to think that there is a true Islam. But what that definition of true Islam is, varies from person to person.16 Mawdudi and Qutb are two such people who had visions of true Islam. Though they, and the organizations they would come to be associated with, had different meanings of true Islam, both held the rulers of the West accountable for the poor moral behaviors of their respective countries, and identified this lack of morality as a corruptive and corrosive force upon and within Islam. Hence, both felt the need for change.

Sayyid Abu'l-A'la Mawdudi was a Pakistani Muslim whose political and religious ideas were conceived during a growing period of intense dislike for the power that occupied India around 1940, namely the British.17 Mawdudi believed that imperialism's “evil lay in the propagation of such moral and ethical evils as women's emancipation, secularism, and nationalism, all of which ran contrary to the teachings of Islam and had caused them to be ignored or rejected.”18 The social situation was ripe for a new socio-religious interpretation of Islam, and Mawdudi took full advantage of this fact. “The need to redefine a Muslim was born from Mawdudi's understanding of the structure of relations among Islam, Hinduism, and the West, and his desire to provide power and identity to Muslims by reversing the balance in relations between Islam and the other two.”19 One of the clues that leads to Mawdudi using a non-traditionalist interpretation of Islam is the fact that he redefined Islam by using concepts “from the intellectual repertoire of the West.”20 In a sense, Mawdudi offers a paradox; he was using the intellectuality of the group he was trying to distance himself from in his new definition of Islam.21 Modernism was the way in which Mawdudi saw Muslims as being able to replicate the previous glory of Islam, in particular the period of Mohammed. He believed that traditional Islam was the “shackles that bound Muslims to an anachronistic existence in the modern world.”22 Islam, therefore, needed to be changed. This idea of modernism that Mawdudi brought into his vision of Islam cannot be understated. Islamization and modernization went hand in hand for Mawdudi; he simultaneously wanted to modernize Islam, and perhaps more importantly, wanted to Islamize modernity.23

Mawdudi thought that once Muslims were loosed from the constraints of traditional Islam, and found what he considered to be true Islam, they would somehow be resistant to the allure of the West. This, he believed, would constitute some type of Islamic revivalism.24 It is clear that Mawdudi is heading in the direction of religious re-interpretation. His intention in infusing modern principles into Islam was to provide Muslims with an equal, but more familiar, contender to western ideology, with the ultimate goal being a restoration of Islam to the glory of its early days with the prophet Mohammed. This is extremely important, as it would lay the groundwork for Islam to emerge anew and forge ahead into not only the next decade, but into the next century. How to implement this was the next question facing Mawdudi. But he provided a way that was applicable to all Muslims; “The future of the whole world of Islam will depend upon the attitude that the Muslims ultimately adopt towards Islam.”25 Mawdudi's new interpretation of Islam would have to take place in each individual. In other words, the ideology must be planted and then allowed to germinate. As Olivier Roy correctly states, “religious universalism spreads only through individual conversion, and defines a community separate from others.”26 Hence this is the reason why what would become the Islamist movement appealed to those who were highly educated.

Islam was at the time, in Mawdudi's mind, in a state of falling.27 The individual Muslim was at fault for the current condition of Islam. “Because they had erred in their obedience to God, they had brought about the decay of Muslim societies and paved the road for Western supremacy...It followed from Mawdudi's argument that the revival of the faith at the individual level was the first step in resuscitating Muslim and social political life.”28 Let us not leave religion out of the picture either. The idea of obedience to God was and is one of the most important theological ideals within Islamism.

Imperative to Mawdudi's re-definition of Islam was the notion of absolute obedience to God. This was the ultimate action of any Muslim and Mawdudi believed this to be the following of the doctrine of tawhid or “the unity and uniqueness of God as creator and sustainer of the universe.”29 Esposito believes that this is the “defining doctrine of Islam…declaring absolute monotheism.”30 Tawhid is categorized as the “raison d'etre of human existence and a function of mankind's position as God's vicegerent on earth.”31 In his obedience to God, man had no choice; it must be done.32 This obedience to God also served as a necessity for the proper functioning of societal order, and as this would indicate, the individual Muslim is not alone in this task. Though the individual is important, in his obedience he is a member of the overall Muslim community, or the ummah . “The religious incumbency of absolute obedience to God, complimented by the compelling logic of its sociopolitical function, transformed Islam from a faith into a movement. From this point on, the adjective Islamic did not define orthodoxy; it invoked the spirit of Mawdudi's da'wah – absolute submission to God.”33 It is apparent at this point that Mawdudi was having a great impact upon fellow Muslims.

Indeed, this represented the breaking point for Mawdudi and traditional Islam. The fact that Mawdudi advocated a belief in which a Muslim had no choice but to make the ‘right' choice, which was to obey God, strayed from the traditional Islamic belief that the Muslim had choice in the matter. Mawdudi believed that the history of Islam was imperfect and was susceptible to falsity because of such human choice. The only time when Islam was not corrupted was during the time of the prophet Mohammed.34 Thus for Mawdudi, a re-interpretation of Islam must encompass a denunciation of the period after the prophet, and an Islamic nation would exist outside the realm of Islam's previous history. Many saw Mawdudi's idea as ‘radical orthodoxy.'35 But the heart of the matter is this: for Mawdudi, choice was the downfall of morality and political hardship. Therefore, surrender in absolute obedience to God was the way to salvation. “The virtuous society could not exist save by the intercession of God and the dissolution of the human faculties of reason and choice in the divinely ordained religious order.”36 In his vision, the political arena was the only valid means through which this new Islam could be displayed and was considered to be the only way to convey the true spirituality of Islam.37

The relationship between politics and religion is extremely important in Mawdudi's new vision of Islam, as they were now inextricably intertwined. Religious works served as sources for reworking Islamic faith, thereby validating and legitimizing that faith. In doing so, they promised “salvation in a way that tied piety to social action.”38 Mawdudi emphasized the use of religious works strongly in the search for religious truth of Islam, and in fact defined ‘true' Islam based on the exegetical reading of these works.39 Yet, Mawdudi emphasized that the Quran was not to be read lightly or in a pleasurable manner. The Quran was for him a “socio-religious institution” and was the ultimate religious source from which true Islam was derived, and therefore the ultimate source for political and social law.40 In other words, Islam should be focused solely on the Quran as the religions be all and end all.

True Islam, for Mawdudi, was based on a different relationship between man and God than traditional Islam holds. He believed that this relationship was to be very public and involved. Success in the earthly realm was dependant upon the cultivation of this relationship, and this would thwart the dark period that Muslims and Islam were experiencing, according to Mawdudi. “The amorphous idea of faith had been replaced with an ideology that would produce tightly knit and tangible relations with authority and provide a more concrete definition of community, political action, and even salvation.”41 It is at this point that there seems to be a transition in terms, according to Nasr, from what was broadly defined as Muslim to what was more narrowly defined as Islamic, and this shift began to construct confining walls around this vision of Islam.42

Mawdudi's interpretation of the Quran has clouded the issue over how to classify Islamists. On the one hand, Mawdudi advocates the exegetical reading of religious works to further the search for true Islam. This seems to hold true for all religious works except for the Quran, which he believed must be interpreted literally, and implemented into politics, society and law ‘as is.' The question seems to be are Islamists fundamentalists because of Mawdudi's literalist interpretation of the Quran, or not? Whether Islamists are considered fundamentalists or not, the government of an Islamic state based on Mawdudi's religious ideology and interpretation of the Quran would be a ‘theocracy.'43

Mawdudi offered a new interpretation of Islam that sought to break away from its traditional roots. In this interpretation, he believed that religion should ultimately be the domineering force that molded politics, and therefore society. Nasr indicates that what Mawdudi was after was ‘true Islam', or what he referred to as din , now redefined to mean “an all embracing ethos.”44 Intricate to this new interpretation and din was the idea that true Muslims must be able to part with traditional Islam and engage in a transformation that would lead to Mawdudi's vision. In doing so, they would adhere strictly to the Quran, and act in absolute obedience to God, letting the Quran dictate political and social activity. As such, Mawdudi placed great emphasis on works, or actions, as this was paramount to Mawdudi's idea that change in Islam began with every Muslim individual. These actions were all to be undertaken in the name of salvation, for Mawdudi believed if Muslims were successful in the conversion to the Islam he had envisioned, they would be rewarded in the afterlife.

Sayyid Qtub, though not a contemporary of Mawdudi, clearly displays Mawdudian influence in his own thought and writing. Qutb, an Egyptian Muslim, active roughly a decade after Mawdudi in the 1950's and 1960's, is even more closely connected to Islamism's political and religious ideology than perhaps Mawdudi, though both share a large degree of mutual influence upon the movement.45

Much like Mawdudi, Qutb believed that the Islam of his time was in a state of disrepair and decline. Moral and ethical laxity seemed to characterize this downfall. Again like Mawdudi, anti-colonialism seem to lay at the heart of the matter for Qutb.46 Working for the Egyptian Ministry of Education in the earlier years of his life, Qutb was sent to America from 1948 to 1950.47 The experience had a profound effect upon him, serving in part to sharpen his view of anti-colonialism more than Mawdudi's. Qutb saw the problem in a larger context than just British imperialism; the offender was “that of the secular, materialist, individualist and capitalist West.”48 He felt that the West had decimated indigenous Islamic communities, and that amends must be made.49 The West, therefore, had a gray, empty and uncompassionate soul.

This view is different than Mawdudi's in one significant regard: The anti-Western feelings held by Mawdudi were based upon what he could glean of colonialism in his own country. Qutb, by comparison, experienced anti-Western feelings first hand in the U.S. . There was no lens that his image of the West had to be filtered through. In other words, the image was not projected, it simply was . Thus, Qutb felt he had found the real infidel, lived among ‘it' and survived. By contrast, in Islam he had found safe ground from which to convey this anti-Western sentiment to the world. Islam provided him with the groundwork for answering political and social problems dogging the world due to Western influence.50 As such, Qutb was heavily active in a religious organization that was founded in roughly 1928 by Hasan al-Bana called the Muslim Brotherhood. He saw this organization as a channel through which to re-organize the ills that had befallen Islam because of Western influence.

In 1954, however, Qutb was arrested by the Egyptian police and the Muslim Brotherhood was disbanded for their anti-nationalist rhetoric. Fearing that the charge would not hold, Qutb was accused of plotting to assassinate the Egyptian President, Nasser.51 While he was in prison, Qutb was allowed to write. He was able to publish many of his ideological beliefs about the need for revolution of and in the state. In particular, Mawdudi focused on how the Islam that was expressed in and through the Quran, or true Quranic Islam, had the potential to become the framework for a universal ideology.52 “It was a faith which would not only change the way in which the individual perceived and apprehended the world, but would simultaneously provide a programme of conduct, which was, of moral necessity, a programme of political action.”53 The Quran was therefore the vehicle through which Muslims could re-structure Islam to become more like the Islam that Mohammed, and for that matter God, envisioned. Again, Mawdudi's influence can be seen here. This re-structuring began with the individual Muslim, and advocated a literalist interpretation of how the ideals set forth in the Quran were to be implemented in society and politics. Qutb wanted to enforce the “idea of re-founding the community on a divinely sanctioned basis” and this meant a re-working of the individuals who would make up this community.54 Qutb, more so that Mawdudi, wanted to move away from these actions having to be explained or rationalized by philosophical means. As Charles Tripp notes, Qutb's implications for the re-structuring of Islam were understandably radical.55

Qutb felt that every Muslim was required to grapple with jahiliyyah , or what Esposito defines as “ignorance of monotheism and divine law.”56 Jahiliyyah can also be referred to as un-Islamic, such as a government that bases its laws on beliefs that are not related to God.57 This jahiliyyah must be combatted in order to restore Islam to its time of glory during the prophet Mohammed's life. Hence, this also meant a restoration of the shariah as the universal and sole governing law. For Qutb, this process entailed the removal, by force if necessary, of man's imposed laws and politics upon society. This was the ultimate struggle or jihad of every Muslim that would restore God as the ultimate and universal sovereign.58 Needless to say, Mawdudi exerted a significant influence over Qutb in this regard. For Qutb, “it is the practical nature of Islam which has been forgotten, and, with it, the duty of Muslims to ensure that it alone is the guide and foundation of their social existence.”59 Once the true Islam that the Quran reveals has been discovered, it is imperative for all Muslims, according to Qutb, to implement these truths in all aspects of society, government and politics, and ensure by whatever means necessary that the shariah , or God's law, is the only law and never repealed or repudiated.

Qutb's new vision of Islam, like Mawdudi's, had several implications, namely that the political realm was now a mere catalyst for the creation and implementation of divine harmony on earth.60 No longer would it have value as a purveyor of immorality as it had in the West, namely in the U.S. . Qutb saw this shift in focus as a streamlining of society towards God. As such, political pursuit was a means of arriving at knowledge about the truth of God and society, under the watchful guise of the Quran, by implementing Quranic ideals into society. Again like Mawdudi, complete surrender and obedience to God and the shariah was paramount for Qutb. There must be complete and utter harmony between humanity and God's law that governs them.61 Following this, humans have no choice in the acquiescence to God. As Tripp notes, “the requirements of divine order supercede anything individuals may think that they want.”62 What, then, should the leader of this new Islamic vision be like? Interestingly, Qutb does not answer this question. He seemingly leaves it open to debate, and perhaps more relevantly, leaves the answer open to a radical interpretation that uses his ideology as a background. This has profound implications as to how this society will be established, run, and promulgated. Thus, when Islamist groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic Taliban emerge, that want to employ radical notions of religion and politics into society, they find structure and meaning in Mawdudi and Qutb's ideology. The important key here seems to be how the ideologies of these two men are interpreted.

For Qutb, though, faith is all that is necessary for the establishment of his vision of Islam. As mentioned earlier, though not impossible, faith is something that is extremely difficult to change. As such, when faith is implemented into political ideology and is integral to religious ideology, there is a link between the human and the divine that is almost unbreakable. To try and dismantle or discount this link means playing right into the hands and the thought of the user or believer, in this case Qutb, al-Qaeda, the Taliban, etc., and in a sense proving the believers point that jahiliyyah elements are in fact alive and well and are working against you and therefore God. When God is attacked, it serves as a call to ‘return fire' as it were for radical organizations, in order to protect the harmony that one is striving for in society, albeit that when one attacks God and the political institution that strives for harmony, it reveals that there is not complete harmony in society. A call to jihad is therefore issued to attain that harmony. And so the cycle would continue. Shades of U.S. embassy bombings in foreign countries, the attack on the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole in Yemen in 2000, and ultimately September 11, 2001 can be seen here as a result of groups like al-Qaeda adopting and interpreting this ideology. As for all militant Islamic and Islamist groups, this rhetoric can easily be seen as rousing and stimulating from the staticisity and mire of the current unacceptable situation, in their view, and what has become normative or accepted as the status quo by others.

What Qutb essentially was advocating was, in a sense, a vision of the idyllic world. Tripp and others refer to this as a vision of utopia, and they are correct in their naming of Qutb's vision. Any religious society whether it is separated from the state or not, has as its goal unison with God. In his discourses, Qutb has given a way to accomplish this. Faith and reason seem to go hand in hand with the shariah as the official law of the state. Therefore, all actions are justified from a faithful and therefore a reasonable perspective, something that other religions – such as Christianity – find conflict with. In the end, a harmony is achieved in society that is founded on the faith of the individual. In Qutb's vision, a leap of faith is necessary to start this new vision of Islam. Reason will thereby follow after faith, and in some real sense, be based on and immersed in it. Though perhaps not logical to the Western mind, the key for Qutb, and for that matter Mawdudi, was faith, which would then transform the individual toward absolute obedience to God. By doing so, jahiliyyah would be distinguished from true Islam, and eliminated as a threat from the harmonizing of shariah , and thereby God, and humanity through political means.

Qutb would only live to see his vision of Islam circulated for a short time. For his ideology, and for suspicion of plotting to assassinate Nasser , the government of Egypt executed Sayyid Qutb in 1966.

An intertwining of religious and political thought is integral to understanding both Mawdudi and Qutb. For both, activity in the political realm must be directed towards finding the truth of God, and implementing this in society. Why is there an Islamist Islam? Many Islamists rely on the ideology of these two men because they see in their thoughts a way to return to pure Islam, resulting from their frustration with what they see as popular acceptance of a status quo that is the tainted modern Muslim world. An interesting question to pose at this point in the discussion is whether or not Mawdudi and Qutb envisioned that their ideologies would be used for such a gross display of anti-Westernism as was demonstrated on September 11 th , 2001 . An educated guess would suggest that they probably would not have. But this guess needs to be qualified by stating that they more than likely would have agreed that their thoughts and ideologies should be left open for interpretation, even if that interpretation was radically oriented. For them, their respective ideologies were not a ‘one and done' deal. No, they would have wanted to encourage Muslims to think in an Islamist manner. But certainly at least Mawdudi, and probably Qutb though perhaps to a lesser extent, would not have wanted to be associated ideologically with the drastic, radical manner in which the events of September 11 th transpired.

Perhaps the two groups that one could call the original ‘Islamist' groups are the organizations affiliated with Mawdudi and Qutb. This research will only touch briefly upon them, but they are worthy of mention. The Jammat-i-Islami was a political group in Pakistan founded by and under the influence of Mawdudi in the 1940's.63 It essentially was a privileged religious organization whose object was to select and train future potential leaders who would come to power, presumably in Pakistan.64 By contrast, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt , but was a more broadly based popular movement with chapters in many Muslim countries.65 Essentially, the two main criticisms voiced by the Muslim Brotherhood, particularly in Egypt , had to do with Western colonialism and Egyptian nationalism. Both groups, however, saw Islam as an independent, universal, self-supporting religion and means of living.66 As such, it was a much better alternative, both religiously and ideologically, to the capitalism of the West and to Marxism.67 The Jammat-i-Islami and the Muslim Brotherhood believed that there were only two choices in the world: Islam or non-Islam, and therefore enlightenment and God versus ignorance and darkness.68

Lest one think that the religious ideology of Mawdudi and Qutb ended with their respective deaths, several groups emerged throughout the 1970's, 1980's and the 1990's that categorize themselves as Islamist groups, and look to both Mawdudi and Qutb for ideological guidance. Although the association of the Saudi dynasty with Wahhabism initially began much earlier, the first major ‘modern' group to do so was the house of Saud in the 1970's who adopted a form of Islamist Islam known as Wahhabism in what would later become Saudi Arabia. Wahhibism is generally thought of as a ‘reactionary theological movement'.69 Its roots date back to an eighteenth century figure called Muhammed Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, who died in 1792.70 Characterized by an intense zeal, al-Wahhab, much like the later figures of Mawdudi and Qutb, believed that Islam had become corrupted by forces such as mysticism, and the doctrines of intercession and rationalism.71 ‘Abd al-Wahhab advocated a strict, literalist interpretation of the Quran, and held the belief that the Quran was the only source of validity for Islam. Intense feelings of antagonism were espoused towards intellectualism, sectarianism, and mysticism in Islam, because all of these influences were infused into Islam by jahiliyyah forces.72 One of the most intense beliefs that ‘Abd al-Wahhab held was that any form of morality that came from outside the Quran was a “form of self-idolatry.”73 Again, like Mawdudi and more so Qutb, philosophical rationalization was to be avoided at all costs. Even as early as the time of ‘Abd al-Wahhab, there is a call for the return of Islam to what is considered its purest days, those being the time of the prophet Mohammed. ‘Abd al-Wahhab considered this to be a time when Islam was “pristine, simple, and straightforward.”74 According to ‘Abd al-Wahhab's thought, this time was able to be re-created by a literalist interpretation of the Quran, and a strict following of the shariah and ritual practice.75

One of the most complex ideals that ‘Abd al-Wahhab held was the doctrine of shirk , or the association of partners with God.76 If a Muslim were to commit a specific act that was to the dislike of ‘Abd al-Wahhab, then that Muslim would be at risk for revealing a false sense of belief in God and in Islam. To be a false Muslim, for ‘Abd al-Wahhab, was one of the most terrible crimes one could commit. Thus, there was no fence-line position for a Muslim; one was either a true Muslim, and therefore a true believer, or one was not.77 It is easy to postulate that imagination and creativity were frowned upon by ‘Abd al-Wahhab, because both of these actions might lead to criticisms of Islam that would lead to the labeling of that thinker as an infidel.78 Again, it is easy to see how, given his views, ‘Abd al-Wahhab had an intense dislike of non-Muslims, as they were seen as a threat to true Islam. As such, he advocates a policy of isolation between Muslims and non-Muslims.

One might ask at this point how the ideology of ‘Abd al-Wahhab has affected modernity. It is a relevant question that begins in the 1950's. Wahhabi ideology was revived during this time by ‘Abd al-Aziz Ibn Abd al-Rahman al-Saud, the first principle ruler of what is now Saudi Arabia . As an ideologue, al-Saud was undoubtedly aware of Mawdudi's writings and ideology, specifically his religious ideology, and in fact could use Mawdudi's ideology as a basis for his acceptance of ‘wahhabism', as the ideals of al-Wahhab are intrinsically present in both Mawdudi and Qutb's thoughts. al-Saud therefore founded the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on the principles and promotion of the ideas of ‘Abd al-Wahhab.

This legacy was carried on by other rulers of the house of Saud, namely Faisal in the 1970's and Khalid in the latter 1970's and early 1980's. In this period, there were two things that seemed to happen at the right time and the right place. First of all, the oil heyday of Gulf nations like Saudi Arabia in the 1970's brought in an astonishing amount of wealth to the country. Now financially stable, the government – who already a had pro-Wahhabist stance – actively and aggressively encouraged Wahhabi ideology throughout the Muslim world, much to the chagrin of other Muslim nations. Part of this chagrin also lay in the fact that the two most holy places in Islam are located on the Arabian Peninsula , which is now called the Saudi Arabian P eninsula. This in and of itself is not so bad, but the ‘guardians' of these holy places were the Saudi's, who believed that Wahhabism and Islam are one in the same, and therefore Wahhabi Islam “is the only possible Islam.”79

Another form of Islamist Islam that is worthy of brief mention can be seen in the militant group al-Qaeda. Though generally unknown to the American public until their involvement in the attack on the U.S. Navy destroyer Cole in the Fall of 2000 in Yemen , and the attack on the World Trade center, and the Pentagon in September 2001, al-Qaeda was formed around 1986 by Osama bin Laden, an expatriate from a wealthy Saudi Arabian family.80 This group primarily called, and for that matter still calls, Afghanistan its home, though they presumably had/have training camps for its members throughout the Middle East and North Africa . al-Qaeda developed a reputation for international terrorist activities as a form of revolt against Western, and western-type, governments not only in America , but also throughout the Muslim world.

Ideologically, the al-Qaeda that bin Laden founded draws upon Wahhabi influence, as well as the influences of contemporary Egyptian, Indian, and other Muslim extremist movements, who have fundamentalist worldviews. Many of these groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat i-Islami, have drawn their influence from Qutb and Mawdudi respectively. In fact, during his education at the Abd-al-Aziz University in Jeddah, Muhammad Qutb, the brother of Sayyid Qutb, taught a course that he took on Islamic studies.81 Thus from a very early age, and also a very formative age in college, having lived in Saudi Arabia, and being taught under the influence of Sayyid Qutb's brother, bin Laden developed an ideological view of the world that was heavily rooted in Wahhabism and in the visions of the Qutb's and the Muslim Brotherhood.82 Like Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb, bin Laden advocated a literalist interpretation of Quranic ideals, and called all Muslims to jihad so that a return of Islam to its true form, and therefore without Western influence, could be undertaken.

Many in the West saw the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 as the end of Communism in Europe , especially in the former USSR . But for Islam, the removal of the wall represented somewhat of a beginning; Islam, and in particular Islamist ideas, were now free to venture into countries that the wall had previously barred.83 No longer relegated to ‘third world' countries, Islam “will long remain the dominant force in the mobilization of the Muslim world's masses in times of crisis.”84 This is true not only for Islam, but more importantly, for interpretations of Islam, such as has been seen with Mawdudi and Qutb. Perhaps what Roy ultimately means by these ‘times of crisis' is that there is a more overarching period of time in which popular Islam has come to regard the West as an enemy and a destabilizing force in the Muslim world. Thinkers like Mawdudi and Qutb can then speak effectively to an audience that is ready to listen and take action through groups like the Jammat-i-Islami, the Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Qaeda.

Islamism has a broad range of interpretations. Though Islamism differs from country to country and from group to group, Islamism and the Islamist movement do share some broad, mutual characteristics. “Islamism begins with a theological concept that is the very foundation of the Muslim religion: divine oneness or tawhid , which says that God is transcendent, unique and without associates…The Islamist contribution (or rupture) with respect to the tradition consists in applying to this theological concept to society, whereas previously it was related exclusively to God.”85 Imperative, then, to any discussion about Islamism is its religious aspect and ideology. Religion is heavily intertwined, and in essence, is the foundation for political action and social change for the Islamist. Or perhaps it is more correct to say that an interpretation of religion is the basis for this. Roy implicates that the goal of Islamism is to have a ‘ tawhidi ' society, in which schism, in all aspects of life (religion, government, culture, society, etc., and most importantly relations with other countries) in naught.86

It is important to note as well, as the author Paul Berman does in his work Terror and Liberalism , that Islam itself is not violence or violent. It is, however, the stage upon which this violence is being played out.87 It is interpretations of Islam that are the causes for violence. One of these interpretations of Islam is Islamism. For Islamists, the Muslim world is deteriorating and has deviated from the forthright path of Islam, based in no small measure upon Western influence.88 Islamism seeks to use religion to remedy the ills of the Muslim world, and therefore the world in general. As such, “religion becomes a vehicle for the redress of public life.”89 As has been shown in some of its most extreme senses with Islamist ideology, belief is combined with action into one ideal to create change. For Islamist Muslims, “to believe in the next world is to be engaged in this world.”90

It is important to remember, though, that no matter what extreme Islam is taken to, it will always be a religion. “Even when it assumes a political dimension, Islam expresses a religious impulse. It is the impulse to align the human imagination with the divine imagination, so that social norms and individual conduct are always directed toward a path readily specified.”91 Sometimes however, violence is used in the name of religion as a way to attract attention to what Islamists see as the problem, and as a way to institute change. In some Islamist's view, violence is a valid form of defense. It is also important to remember that for these Islamist Muslims, God is watching them. Hence, faith is one of the most important and dangerous aspects to Islamism.

The importance in understanding the religious ideologies of Islamist figures like Mawdudi and Qutb lies in the influence that their ideologies and interpretations have upon others. When one boils down the modern Islamist movement to its ideological factors, a valid argument can be made for the assertion that religion is its backbone. If policy makers in both the U.S. and other Western democratic nations can understand this, it will go a long way towards understanding how to formulate a policy that will deal with Islamist nations, governments, and groups in a constructive, effective, and efficient way. Because there are many variations of Islamism, there is in a sense no ‘one solution plan' that could be implemented, as it is a virtual impossibility to predict how one group will react versus another. But as is evident here, there are certain characteristics that are common to many Islamist people, groups, and movements. As long as policy makers can understand those commonalities, they will be in a much better position of making progress and educated decisions in their dealings with those entities than if they were not aware of their ideologies. If this is noted, then fruitful dialogue may be engaged. And this, arguably, is the ultimate point; a finite solution to the Islamist impasse with the West may be too delicate a matter to rush into completion. But as long as lines of communication are kept open on both sides, tragedies like September 11 th can be averted.

1 Lawrence, Bruce B. Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence Princeton , NJ : Princeton University Press, 1998.

2 Esposito, John L., ed. The Oxford Dictionary of Islam Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003. In this work, there are no indications as to who specifically contributed to what definitions and terms.

4 Roy, Olivier The Failure of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 3.

5 Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 14.

7 Roy, Olivier The Failure of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 3.

9 Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1992, p.16.

10 Roy, Olivier The Failure of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 3.

12 Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1992, p.16.

13 Roy, Olivier The Failure of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 4.

14Lawrence , Bruce B. Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence Princeton , NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998, p.22.

15 Feldman, Noah After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy New York : Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2003, p. 20.

17 Kepel, Giles Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002. Additionally Mawdudi had also lived through the partitioning of India , which produced a sense of universal humiliation among Indian Muslims, as Islam had a distinguished history in India going back to the twelfth century A.D. By 1947, that chapter of Islamic history had closed.

18 Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 49.

21 Kepel, Giles Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.

22 Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 52.

24 Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Mawdudi and the Jammat-i-Islami: The Origins, Theory and Practice of Islamic Revivalism from Rahnema, Ali, ed. Pioneers of Islamic Revival London : Zed Books Ltd., 1994.

25 Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 55.

26 Roy, Olivier The Failure of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 6.

27 Kepel, Giles Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.

28 Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 55.

29 Esposito, John L., ed. The Oxford Dictionary of Islam Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003.

31 Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 55.

32 Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Mawdudi and the Jammat-i-Islami: The Origins, Theory and Practice of Islamic Revivalism from Rahnema, Ali, ed. Pioneers of Islamic Revival London : Zed Books Ltd., 1994.

33 Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 58.

35 Kepel, Giles Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.

36 Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 58.

38 Kepel, Giles Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.

39 Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 63.

41 Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 62.

43 Kepel, Giles Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.

45 Tripp, Charles Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision from Rahnema, Ali, ed. Pioneers of Islamic Revival London : Zed Books Ltd., 1994.

48 Moussalli, Ahmad S. Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb Beirut , Lebanon : American University of Beirut , 1992.

49 Tripp, Charles Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision from Rahnema, Ali, ed. Pioneers of Islamic Revival London : Zed Books Ltd., 1994.

54 Esposito, John L., ed. The Oxford Dictionary of Islam Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003.

56 Tripp, Charles Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision from Rahnema, Ali, ed. Pioneers of Islamic Revival London : Zed Books Ltd., 1994.

61 Kepel, Giles Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.

62 Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1992.

64 Kepel, Giles Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.

65 Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1992.

67 Safi , Omid The Times They Are A-Changin' : A Muslim Quest For Justice, Gender Equality, and Pluralism in Safi , Omid, ed. Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism Oxford : Oneworld, 2003. It is worth noting here that this work of collected essays is an extremely valuable source of current knowledge and information on contemporary Islam.

68 Fadl, Khaled Abou El The Ugly Modern and the Modern Ugly: Reclaiming the Beautiful In Islam in Safi , Omid, ed. Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism Oxford : Oneworld, 2003.

77 Kepel, Giles Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.

80 Kepel, Giles Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002, p. 9.

81 Roy, Olivier The Failure of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 6.

85 Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1992, p.19.

86 Lawrence , Bruce B. Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence Princeton , NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998, p.14.

• Berman, Paul Terror and Liberalism New York : W.W. Norton and Company, 2003.

• Esposito, John L. The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1992.

• Esposito, John L., ed. The Oxford Dictionary of Islam Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003.

• Feldman, Noah After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy New York : Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2003.

• Kepel, Giles Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002.

• Lawrence, Bruce B. Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence Princeton , NJ : Princeton University Press, 1998.

• Moussalli, Ahmad S. Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb Beirut , Lebanon : American University of Beirut , 1992.

• Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1996.

• Nasr, Seyyed Vali Reza Mawdudi and the Jammat-i-Islami: The Origins, Theory and Practice of Islamic Revivalism from Rahnema, Ali, ed. Pioneers of Islamic Revival London : Zed Books Ltd., 1994.

10.) Tripp, Charles Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision from Rahnema, Ali, ed. Pioneers of Islamic Revival London : Zed Books Ltd., 1994.

11.) Roy, Olivier The Failure of Political Islam Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press, 1994.

12.) Safi , Omid The Times They Are A-Changin' : A Muslim Quest For Justice, Gender Equality, and Pluralism in Safi , Omid, ed. Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism Oxford : Oneworld, 2003.

13.) Fadl, Khaled Abou El The Ugly Modern and the Modern Ugly: Reclaiming the Beautiful In Islam in Safi , Omid, ed. Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender, and Pluralism Oxford : Oneworld, 2003.